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In this article, Li considers the implications of
the Supreme Court of Canada’s Alta Energy
judgment for determining the purpose of tax
treaty provisions under general antiabuse rules
and suggests that a treaty’s text and context
should carry more weight than inferred
negotiator intentions.
Establishing the object and purpose of tax
treaty provisions lies at the heart of applying
antiabuse rules, such as general antiavoidance
rules under domestic law1 and the principal
2
purpose test (PPT) in tax treaties. Tax planning
arrangements like treaty shopping, designed to
obtain treaty benefits, are not abusive unless they

1

In Canada, the GAAR is found in section 245 of the Income Tax Act
(RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended).
2

The PPT is found in article 7(1) of the Multilateral Convention to
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting and has been included in “Covered Tax Agreements.” The
MLI entered into force in Canada on December 1, 2019.

contravene the object and purpose of the
provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.
Because the purpose of the applicable
provision is rarely stated in the text, one must find
it by looking beyond the plain words of the
provision. But how much beyond? Given that a
tax treaty is an agreement between countries, to
what extent may courts in one country impute
intention of treaty negotiators to both countries? Is
the “intention” of treaty negotiators the same as
the “purpose” of the treaty? What are the
appropriate ways of finding purpose?
The 6-3 split decision of the Supreme Court of
3
Canada in Alta Energy offers insights into these
questions. The 189-paragraph judgment covers
many aspects of the GAAR and treaty
4
interpretation. This article focuses on aspects of
the judgment related to the finding of “object,
spirit and purpose” of the provision in dispute —
the carveout in article 13(4) of the CanadaLuxembourg tax treaty.5
As the first decision by the highest court of any
country on the intersection of a domestic GAAR
and “treaty shopping” involving article 13 of the

3

Canada v. Alta Energy Luxembourg SARL, 2021 SCC 49, aff’g 2020 FCA
43, aff’g 2018 TCC 152.
4

For commentaries on the case, see Brian Arnold, “Supreme Court
Decides Alta Energy Luxembourg for the Taxpayer,” Canadian Tax
Foundation, Dec. 9, 2021; Allan Lanthier, “Our Toothless Tax-Avoidance
Rules,” Financial Post, Dec. 8, 2021; Matias Milet and Ilana Ludwin, “Alta
Energy: Taxpayer Wins in Supreme Court of Canada Treaty-Shopping
Appeal,” Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 17, 2021, p. 1411; and Scott Wilkie, “The
Taxpayer Is Successful Today at the Supreme Court in the Important Alta
Energy ‘Treaty Shopping’ Case,” Tax at Osgoode Hall Law School:
Conversation and Commentary on Tax Law blog, Nov. 26, 2021.
5

The Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty entered into force on October
17, 2000, was amended on May 8, 2012, through a protocol (a protocol
that is not relevant to this analysis), and is now a covered tax agreement.
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6

OECD model tax convention, Alta Energy may
have significant implications for the application of
the PPT in existing tax treaties and a future
multilateral tax convention to implement pillar 1
on the taxation of large multinational
7
corporations’ residual profit.
Following an overview of the purpose test in
Section I, this article discusses the Alta Energy case
in terms of the facts, the main issue, and the split
decision. It shows how the majority and dissent
reach their decisions and highlights some
takeaways. Section III argues that the Court
adopted a problematic approach to finding the
purpose of the carveout by conflating the treaty
purpose and negotiator intention and not giving
sufficient weight to the language and structure of
the treaty. It explains that the treaty provisions
related to the carveout do not necessarily support
the conclusion that the carveout is a deliberate tax
incentive and offer stronger support for the
dissent’s view that “residence” requires a
“genuine economic connection.” The article
concludes with observations about the
implications of this case for the Canadian GAAR
and the PPT in tax treaties.
I. The Importance of ‘Purpose’
The notion of purpose is the “black box at the
8
centre of most GAAR rules and GAAR disputes.”
The same can be said of the PPT. It is challenging
to apply the purpose test in domestic tax
avoidance cases as well as treaty-shopping cases.
A. The Purpose Test

to obtain a tax benefit, which is the precondition
for applying the GAAR or PPT. The second is the
purpose of the provisions relied upon by the
taxpayer in obtaining the tax benefit. This article
considers only the latter — legislative purpose.
1. GAAR
The Canadian GAAR states that if a
transaction is an avoidance transaction (a
transaction entered into for the primary purpose
of obtaining a tax benefit), the benefit will be
denied, but only if the transaction is abusive.
Canadian courts have interpreted abuse to
9
involve a two-step inquiry. First, what is the
object, spirit, and purpose of the provisions relied
on for the tax benefit? This is established by
conducting a “textual, contextual and purposive”
construction of the provisions. Second, does the
avoidance transaction frustrate the object, spirit,
and purpose of the provisions? Because “spirit” is
an elusive concept, the “object, spirit, and
purpose” test is often reduced to a “purpose” or
“rationale” test. As such, finding the legislative
purpose of the relevant provision is the key.
By virtue of section 4.1 of the Income Tax
10
Conventions Interpretation Act (ITCIA), the
GAAR applies to Canadian tax treaties.
2. PPT
The PPT in article 7(1) of the Multilateral
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (MLI) is included in many Canadian tax
11
treaties. It states:
Notwithstanding any provisions of a
Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under
the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be
granted in respect of an item of income or

The purpose test under the GAAR and PPT
has two aspects. The first is the determination of
whether the primary purpose of the transaction is

6

OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2017.
Article 13(4) of the Canada-Luxembourg treaty was not in the
contemporary OECD model (1977-1999), but was in the U.N. model
convention (1980). The Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina decided a
treaty-shopping case in Molinos Rio de la Plata in September 2021 against
the taxpayer. The case was about dividends paid by a regional holding
company located in a treaty country. For comments, see Guillermo O.
Teijeiro, “Comments Apropos Molinos Rio de la Plata SA,” Kluwer Tax
Blog, Sept.11, 2021.
7

OECD, “Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising
From the Digitalisation of the Economy” (Oct. 8, 2021); OECD,
“Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges
Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy” (Oct. 8, 2021).
8

Graeme S. Cooper, “The Role and Meaning of ‘Purpose’ in Statutory
GAARs,” SSRN (Mar. 2016).
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9

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54; Copthorne
Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63.
10

Section 4.1 of the ITCIA states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of
a convention or the Act giving the convention the force of law in Canada,
it is hereby declared that the law of Canada is that section 245 of the
Income Tax Act applies to any benefit provided under the convention.”
11

Canada signed the MLI on June 7, 2017. The PPT was included as
part of Bill C-82, The Multilateral Instrument in Respect of Tax
Conventions Act, S.C. 2019, c. 12, which entered into force on December
1, 2019. When Canada signed the MLI, it listed 75 of its 93 bilateral tax
treaties as covered tax agreements under the MLI; see Canada,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, “Status of List
of Reservations and Notifications at the Time of Signature” (May 30,
2017). Upon ratification of the MLI as Bill C-82, Canada expanded the list
to 84 covered tax agreements.
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capital if it is reasonable to conclude,
having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining that benefit
was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted
directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless
it is established that granting that benefit
in these circumstances would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of
the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement. [Emphasis added.]
Unlike a limitation on benefits provision,
which looks through legal constructs to determine
residential connections by reference to specific
tests, such as ownership and active trade or
business tests, the PPT is a purpose-based rule,
like the GAAR.12
B. Challenges in Finding Legislative Purpose
1. Domestic Law
Finding legislative purpose is inherently
challenging because the text of the controversial
provision is open to at least two possible
interpretations. One, often textual, is relied upon
by taxpayers in designing the avoidance
transaction. The other is often advanced by the
Minister of National Revenue (MNR) and goes
beyond the text into the realm of general
principles, policies, or even theories. Judges must
find the “right” purpose as a matter of statutory
interpretation to resolve the dispute at hand.
There is a tendency to turn a GAAR case into
a reference case on the general meaning of
fundamental concepts, such as “cost”13 or
14
“capital,” which borders on legislative or
policymaking, domains into which judges are
generally hesitant to venture. As such, Canadian
courts require the government to bear the burden
of establishing the existence of abuse such that “it
cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax benefit

would be consistent with the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions relied upon by the
taxpayer.” Otherwise, the benefit of the doubt
15
goes to the taxpayer.
Legislative purpose is difficult to establish
because the government must use tangible
evidence (such as the statute read as a whole,16
legislative scheme, or extrinsic documents) to
reveal the intangible purpose. Having the Income
Tax Act read as a whole is a fiction because it is
unreasonable to expect anyone to meaningfully
read the entire statute: It weighs over one
kilogram in print and embodies the fiscal choices
made over a century. It takes a great deal of effort
and capacity on the part of lawyers to distill the
materials into coherent legal analysis and
arguments for judges to consider. It is therefore
unclear what contextual analysis entails in a given
case.
Judicial attitude toward the GAAR may also
17
play a role. The GAAR jurisprudence, including
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
18
Lipson, suggests that judges who favor tax
certainty and taxpayers’ right to tax minimization
or the Duke of Westminster principle19 tend to find
a legislative purpose that confers the tax benefit
sought by the taxpayer.
C. Treaty Interpretation
Finding the object and purpose of treaty
provisions is a different exercise and can be
challenging for several reasons. First, as an
agreement between two countries, a treaty reflects
the bargain of the parties and is an instrument of
public international law. Treaty interpretation is
guided by article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
20
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) :

15

Canada Trustco, 2005 SCC at 66. Also, an artificial transaction or
transaction lacking economic substance is not by itself abusive.
16

This is part of the text of the GAAR.

17

12

Canada has decided not to include the simplified LOB in its MLI
and may adopt comprehensive LOBs in the future through bilateral
negotiation, in addition to or in replacement of the PPT. See Department
of Finance Canada, “Backgrounder: Impact of Multilateral Convention
to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting” (last updated June 6, 2017). Whether that decision will
change in light of the Alta Energy decision is not yet known.

Jinyan Li and Thaddeus Hwong, “GAAR in Action: An Empirical
Exploration of Tax Court of Canada Cases (1997-2009) and Judicial
Decision Making,” 61(2) Canadian Tax J. 321-366 (2013); Hwong and Li,
“GAAR in Action: An Empirical Study of Transaction Types and Judicial
Attributes in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,” 68(2) Canadian Tax J.
539-578 (2020).
18

13

19

14

20

Canada Trustco, 2005 SCC at 54.
Copthorne, 2011 SCC at 63.

Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.
A tax treaty differs from a domestic tax statute
in terms of its objectives and nature. One of the
main purposes of a tax treaty is to prevent double
taxation, whereas the main objective of domestic
taxation is raising revenue. To prevent double
taxation, a treaty assigns taxing rights to the two
countries by reference to the residence of
taxpayers and source of income. In effect, a treaty
limits the application of domestic law and reduces
a contracting state’s tax revenue. From a taxpayer
perspective, a treaty is relieving as it can reduce
(but never increase) the tax liability that otherwise
exists under domestic law. However, unlike tax
incentive provisions in domestic law, treaty
provisions confer tax benefits to taxpayers in
order to enable the two tax systems to intersect
without creating double taxation, as opposed to
explicitly encouraging specific taxpayer
behaviors. The approach to interpreting domestic
21
tax incentive provisions may therefore be
inappropriate to treaty interpretation.
A tax treaty also differs from domestic law in
drafting style. Most Canadian treaties are based
on the OECD model, and the provisions are
drafted in more general language. In contrast, the
ITA is uniquely Canadian as it reflects the fiscal
choices made by Canadians. It is drafted in highly
technical, detailed, and complex language, replete
with exceptions, tax expenditures, and specific
antiavoidance rules. It is amended frequently,
sometimes many times a year. A tax treaty is
seldom amended. Treaties should not be expected
to be as technically detailed as domestic law, but
judges may not be alert to this point.
Determining the purpose of treaty provisions
involves different considerations, such as the
contractual nature of treaties, the drafting style
and relieving effect of treaties, the existence of the
OECD model and commentaries that have no

counterparts in domestic law, and the treaty’s
reliance on domestic law to take effect. How to
incorporate these considerations in applying the
purpose test to treaty-shopping arrangements is
challenging. This is evident in the Alta Energy
case.
II. The Alta Energy Case
A. Overview
Alta Energy is known as a treaty-shopping
case. It continues taxpayers’ winning streak in
22
Canadian courts: MIL (Investments) (2007),
23
24
Prévost Car (2009), and Velcro Canada (2012). Like
MIL (Investments), Alta Energy deals with article
13(4) of the Canada-Luxembourg treaty and the
relevance of the Canadian GAAR, but with an
emphasis on the carveout. Article 13(4) states:
Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting
State from the alienation of . . . shares . . .
forming part of a substantial interest in the
capital stock of a company the value of
which shares is derived principally from
immovable property situated in that other
State . . . may be taxed in that other State.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the term
“immovable property” does not include
property (other than rental property) in which
the business of the company, partnership, trust
or estate was carried on. [Emphasis added.]
Under article 13(4), if a resident of
Luxembourg sells the shares of its Canadian
subsidiary company that owns immovable
property in Canada, the capital gains may be
taxed in Canada under Canadian domestic law.
However, article 13(4) does not apply to
immovable property (other than rental property)
in which the business of the Canadian company
was carried on (the carveout, or business property
exemption). The capital gains will be taxed only in
Luxembourg under article 13(5).
The carveout applies if the shareholder of the
Canadian company is a resident of Luxembourg
and the gains are attributable to business

21

Canadian GAAR jurisprudence has been mostly about transactions
designed to avoid the application of revenue-raising provisions and
circumvent the application of specific antiavoidance rules. See Jinyan Li,
“The Misuse or Abuse Exception: The Role of Economic Substance,” in
The General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Past, Present, and Future at 295-325
(2021).
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22
23
24

R. v. MIL (Investments) SA, 2007 FCA 236.
The Queen v. Prévost Car Inc., 2009 FCA 57.
Velcro Canada Inc. v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 57.

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 105, JANUARY 10, 2022
For more Tax Notes® International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2022 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS

property. The second condition was found by the
Tax Court of Canada to have been met and that
decision was not the subject of appeal.
The main issue before the Court is whether the
taxpayer’s residence in Luxembourg was
consistent with the purpose of article 13(4) or was
abusive within the meaning of the GAAR. The
taxpayer conceded that the treaty-shopping
arrangement was an avoidance transaction
because the primary purpose was to take
advantage of the carveout clause. The key
question is whether a Luxembourg resident must
have some economic connection with
Luxembourg. Six justices answered no and three
answered yes.

employees or office of its own. It was a singlepurpose holding company. Between 2012 and
2013 Alta Canada had six wells drilled and was a
nonoperator in two additional wells.
In August 2013 Luxco sold the shares of Alta
Canada to Chevron for a gain of C $380 million.
Luxco did not conduct any other business or
investment either before or after the sale. It
claimed exemption of the capital gains from
Canadian tax by virtue of the carveout. The MNR
accepted that Luxco was a resident of
26
Luxembourg but invoked the GAAR to deny the
treaty exemption.

B. The Facts

Justice Suzanne Côté, writing for the majority,
concludes that the MNR has not discharged her
burden of proof about abuse and the GAAR does
not apply. Her opening paragraphs set the tone
for her analysis and reasoning:

The facts of this case are not disputed.25 In
April 2011 Alta Energy Partners LLC, a Delaware
LLC (Alta US), was created by a Texas-based oil
and gas firm and a New York-based private equity
firm in the form of a limited partnership to
acquire and develop unconventional oil and
natural gas properties in North America.
Approximately 50 percent of the private equity
investors were U.S. citizens or residents,
including institutional investors.
In June 2011 Alta Canada was incorporated as
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alta US. From June
2011 to April 2012, Alta Canada obtained licenses
granting limited term exclusive rights to drill for
and recover oil and natural gas. These licenses do
not grant legal title to the surface of the land. By
March 2013 Alta Canada had acquired licenses
and leases for 67,891 acres in the Duvernay shale
(in the province of Alberta), most of which were
acquired before the restructuring steps described
below.
On April 19, 2012, the taxpayer company, Alta
Energy Luxembourg SARL (Luxco) was
incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg. Its
sole shareholder was a partnership established in
Canada, and the partners were the investors in
Alta US. On the same day, Alta US transferred its
common shares of Alta Canada to Luxco for a
demand promissory note. Luxco had no

C. The Majority’s Decision

The principles of predictability, certainty,
and fairness and respect for the right of
taxpayers to legitimate tax minimization
are the bedrock of tax law. In the context of
international tax treaties, respect for
negotiated bargains between contracting
states is fundamental to ensure tax
certainty and predictability and to uphold
the principle of pacta sunt servanda (parties
to a treaty must keep their sides of the
bargain and perform their obligations in
good faith, Art. 26 of the [VCLT]),
pursuant to which parties to a treaty must
keep their sides of the bargain.
[The GAAR] acts [as] a legislative limit on
tax certainty by barring abusive tax
avoidance transactions, including those in
which taxpayers seek to obtain treaty
benefits that were never intended by the
contracting states. . . . In the bilateral treaty
context, there are two sovereign states
whose intentions are relevant.

26

25

Details are found in the annex to the decision of the Tax Court of
Canada in Alta Energy Luxembourg SARL v. The Queen, 2018 TCC 152
(“annex”).

Id. at paras. 121 and 122. In addition to the GAAR, the MNR had
challenged the taxpayer’s claim that the entire amount of capital gains
was attributable to immovable property in which Alta Canada’s business
was carried on, because Alta Canada drilled in and extracted
hydrocarbons from only a small area of the 67,891 acres that it
controlled. The Tax Court of Canada rejected this challenge.
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In Côté’s view, the MNR’s argument that the
Luxembourg treaty was not intended to benefit
residents without “sufficient substantive
economic connections” to their state of residence
and that Luxco’s treaty benefit should be denied
under the GAAR is tantamount to asking the
Court to use the GAAR to change the result of the
treaty bargain by “fundamentally altering the
criteria under which a person is entitled to the
benefits of the Treaty, thus frustrating the certainty
and predictability sought by the
27
drafters” (emphasis in original).
The criterion for accessing treaty benefit is
“residence.” Under articles 1 and 4(1) of the treaty,
residence requires the taxpayer to be “liable to
tax,” not “in fact subject to taxation.”28 A formal
test, such as the “place of incorporation” or “legal
seat,” as opposed to the “real location of a
corporation’s economic activities” is used by
29
many countries, including Canada. The fact that
article 28(3) of the treaty excludes some “holding
companies” from the treaty implies that not every
company with limited economic ties to
Luxembourg is not a resident of that country. The
“spirit” of articles 1 and 4 was not to limit access
to the benefits of the treaty to corporations with
“sufficient substantive economic connections” to
their country of residence.
Côté finds the carveout to be a clear departure
from the economic allegiance theory and that its
purpose is to encourage investment in Canada. As
a tax incentive, the carveout “was never intended
to be limited to companies with ‘sufficient
substantive economic connections’ to
30
Luxembourg.” Since Canadian treaty
negotiators understood that Luxembourg was a
low-tax jurisdiction and decided to trade tax
revenue for jobs and economic opportunities by
agreeing to the carveout, the GAAR cannot be
used “to judicially amend or renegotiate a
31
treaty.”
Côté also draws negative reference from the
absence of an anti-treaty-shopping rule in article

13. She says Canada and Luxembourg chose to
restrict the beneficial ownership rule to articles 10,
11, and 12, and to not include a subject-to-tax
provision in article 13. Had the parties truly
intended to deprive conduit corporations of the
benefits of the carveout, they would have made
the carveout subject to a purpose-based
antiavoidance rule (such as the rule in Canada’s
treaties with Nigeria, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
32
Uzbekistan, and Peru) :
The absence of any such anti-avoidance
measure that would have limited access to
the carve-out in a treaty with a country
known for not taxing capital gains leads
me to believe that Canada weighed the
pros and cons and concluded that its
national interest in attracting foreign
investors, using Luxembourg as a conduit
to take advantage of the carve-out,
outweighed its interest in collecting more
tax revenues on such capital gains. . . . This
choice must also have been motivated by
the fact that Canada was not keen on going
its own way at a time when the
international community was not yet as
serious about curtailing treaty shopping
as it was during the years leading to the
33
signature and ratification of the [MLI].
Côté also takes notice of some broad
background evidence, such as the facts that:
• Canada is a capital importing country;
• “harsh source taxes chase away foreign
investors, whereas tax breaks attract them”;
• Luxembourg is a known tax haven; and
• treaty shopping was not an unforeseen tax
strategy at the time of the Luxembourg
34
treaty.
Given the holding that the object, spirit, and
purpose of the carveout is to foster international
35
investment, the treaty provisions “operated as
they were intended to operate.”36 Therefore, there
was no abuse.

27

32

28

33

29

34

30

35

31

36

Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, at para. 4.
Id. at para. 54.
Id. at para. 61.
Id. at para. 6.
Id. at paras. 8 and 9.
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Id. at para. 86.
Id. at para. 87.
Id. at paras. 77 and 82.
Id. at para. 89.
Id. at para. 94.
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D. The Dissent
Justices Malcolm Rowe and Sheilah L. Martin
wrote the dissent opinion and were joined by
Chief Justice Richard Wagner. They agree with the
MNR and held that the treaty-shopping
arrangement is abusive under the GAAR. They
state:
Multinational companies exploiting gaps
and mismatches in international tax rules
erode domestic tax bases and cost
countries an estimated US$100 to US$240
billion in lost revenue annually. . . .
In introducing the GAAR . . . Parliament
made a policy choice by which it intended
to fight harmful tax avoidance schemes
that cross the line of legitimate tax
planning and venture into the realm of
abusive tax avoidance.
Courts now have the responsibility to give
proper effect to the intention of Parliament
and ensure the GAAR plays a meaningful
role in controlling avoidance transactions
that technically comply with the
provisions of a tax treaty but frustrate
their underlying rationale. The
interpretation exercise that is mandated in
a GAAR analysis thus vests upon courts
the unusual duty to look beyond the words
of the applicable provisions to determine
whether the transactions in question
frustrate the underlying rationale of those
provisions. [Emphasis in original.]
Given the GAAR can only find application
where a taxpayer has complied with the
strict requirements of a provision,
absolute certainty cannot be achieved, nor
was it intended. This is a legislative choice
that Parliament made in order to strike a
necessary balance between the uncertainty
inherent in the GAAR and the fairness of
the Canadian tax system as a whole
achieved by defeating abusive tax
37
avoidance schemes.
They agree with the majority that the carveout
is a tax incentive, but its purpose and rationale is

to limit the tax benefit to companies with
“genuine economic connections” with
Luxembourg.
The main basis for their finding is the
economic allegiance theory. Rowe and Martin
state that this theory explains why articles 1 and 4
limit the beneficiaries of the treaty to the residents
of either state and why active income is generally
taxable in the source country while passive
income is taxed primarily in the residence
country. While capital gains are not clearly active
or passive income, article 13 generally reflects the
economic allegiance theory.38 The carveout clause
allocates the taxing right to the residence state to
reflect the fact that gains from immovable
property in which business is carried on are
driven by business activity and have closer
39
economic ties with the residence state. It follows
the same logic of the treaty. To benefit from the
carveout, the taxpayer must have economic ties
with the residence country.
In the view of Rowe and Martin, the lack of a
specific anticonduit rule in article 13 “sheds little
40
light on their underlying rationale,” and the
implied exclusion principle has already been
clearly rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court
in Copthorne on the ground that it would be “a full
response in all GAAR cases, because the actions of
a taxpayer will always be permitted by the text of
41
the Act.” They believe that Canada has not
deliberately decided to extend the tax incentive in
the Luxembourg treaty to investors in third
countries:
Our colleague’s reasons assume that the
federal government deliberately set out, in
the exercise of its treaty making authority,
to create the conditions for unlimited tax
avoidance by means of schemes such as
that in which Alta Luxembourg was used.
To state such a proposition is to expose its

38

Id. at paras. 152-157, 162-165.

39

Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, para. 157. Rowe and Martin also quoted
the following in para. 157: “The rationale underlying this carve-out is
that where a non-resident actively invests in immovable property
situated in the source country, tax should be levied in the residence
country” (Christians and Benoit-Guay, at p. 4/15 (emphasis added)).”
This statement is incorrect as active business income is taxable primarily
in the source country pursuant to article 7.
40

37

41

Id. at paras. 98-101.

Id. at para. 150.
Id. at para. 145.
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absurdity, yet our colleague seeks to
legitimize such blatantly abusive tax
avoidance based on the view that Canada
should have negotiated different treaty
terms. The focus on what else could
hypothetically have been agreed to is
misplaced. It involves ex ante speculation
about how the treaty parties ought to have
proceeded based on alternatives said to
have been available to them. However,
such an argument gives primacy to what is
not there. We are of the view that
Parliament was entitled to rely on the
GAAR to address abusive uses of the
Treaty rather than negotiate the inclusion
of a specific rule. The focus should be on
what was actually agreed upon and
whether the underlying rationale of the
relevant provisions was frustrated by the
avoidance transactions undertaken. In the
give and take of treaty negotiation,
Canada certainly did not give up the
42
GAAR.
Given that the purpose and rationale of the
carveout is to encourage investments by
companies with genuine economic ties to
Luxembourg, the avoidance transactions are
“disconnected from the economic objectives
43
underlying the bargain” and thus abusive.
Luxco’s presence in Luxembourg “is not
genuine,” is “mere gossamer,” “was
44
manufactured out of whole cloth,” and was used
to liquidate an investment in Canada without
paying Canadian tax.
E. Some Takeaways
There are some important takeaways from the
Alta Energy decision. Despite the 6-3 split in the
decision, all nine justices find that:
• economic allegiance theory underlies the
general allocation of taxing rights;
• the carveout is a tax incentive; and
• treaty shopping is not inherently abusive
under the GAAR.

The majority and dissent draw inferences
from broad extrinsic evidence about the intention
of treaty negotiators but came to different
conclusions. They differ about whether any
economic connections with Luxembourg are
required to benefit from the tax incentive. That, of
course, is the key issue in treaty-shopping cases.
Côté states that treaty shopping may be
45
considered immoral, but the application of the
GAAR is not premised on a “value judgement of
46
what is right or wrong.” Taxpayers are entitled to
enter into transactions to minimize tax, and the
government can decide what is right or wrong
and translate these decisions into legislation that
courts can apply. “The courts’ role is limited to
determining whether a transaction abuses the
object, spirit, and purpose of the specific
provisions relied on by the taxpayer. It is not to
rewrite tax statutes and tax treaties to prevent
treaty shopping when these instruments do not
47
clearly do so.”
Rowe and Martin agree with the majority on
the morality point. However, they draw a line
between acceptable and abusive treaty-shopping.
A treaty-shopping arrangement is abusive when
there is an absence of any “genuine economic
connection with the state of residence.” When
contracting parties allocate taxing rights to the
state of residence on the basis of economic
allegiance, this abusive type of treaty shopping
“upsets the balance and reciprocity of the tax
treaty,” and undermines the rationale of the treaty
48
provisions. They do not say, however, what
constitutes “genuine economic connection” in
situations in which the conduit is more than a
“mere gossamer.”
III. The Purpose of Treaty Provisions
A. The Alta Energy Approach Is Problematic
The Court’s ways of finding the purpose of the
carveout in article 13(4) are problematic for three
main reasons. First, the Court fails to pay
sufficient attention to the differences between

45
42

46

43

47

44

48

Id. at para. 171.
Id. at para. 173.
Id. at paras. 167 and 169.
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domestic tax statutes and tax treaties. The
majority apply the implied exclusion doctrine as if
the treaty were written in the same way as the
ITA. The whole court characterizes the carveout
as a tax incentive provision because of its
apparent departure from the OECD model and its
effect. This shows a misunderstanding of the role
of the OECD model. As explained in more detail
below, such characterization is not supported by
the text and context of article 13(4). On the
contrary, the carveout is arguably more consistent
with the “normative benchmark” of the treaty in
distributing taxing rights over income from
property and capital gains from alienation of
property that is effectively connected with a
business.
Second, the Court seems to conflate intention
of treaty negotiators and the purpose of treaty
provisions. As discussed in more detail below,
this is problematic. In applying the GAAR to
domestic law provisions, the Court has
emphasized legislative purpose or rationale, as
opposed to legislators’ intention.49 Intention
denotes a state of mind of a large and diverse
group of legislators at the time of enactment of
legislation. Purpose or rationale (which can be
broadly understood to include policy) of statutory
provisions may not depend on any one person’s
intentions. The same can be said of tax treaties.
Finally, the Court infers the intention of
Canada and Luxembourg from broad extrinsic
materials, including scholarly and professional
commentaries. The majority also considers the
implied exclusion principle and the fact that
Canada was interested in attracting investment.
The dissent considers the economic allegiance
theory and general treaty logic in allocating
taxing rights. Insufficient consideration was given
to the treaty’s text and context.
B. The Implied Exclusion Doctrine
Under the implied exclusion doctrine, an
argument is made that if the contracting states
had meant to address an avoidance plan, they
would have referred to that plan expressly, and
the failure to do so is presumably intentional. The
majority adopts this doctrine in finding that the

absence of a specific anticonduit rule in article
13(4) confirms the view that Canada’s primary
objective was to attract foreign investment.
The majority’s view is incorrect. As pointed
out by the dissent, the implied exclusion doctrine
was rejected by the Court in Copthorne as it would
gut the GAAR. Applying this doctrine to treaty
interpretation ignores the fact that treaties are not
written in a detailed, airtight manner because
they are meant to coordinate the intersection of
two tax systems as opposed to specifying the
details on determination of tax liability for
taxpayers. More importantly, section 4.1 of the
ITCIA is intended to reduce the need for specific
antiavoidance rules in tax treaties.
C. Purpose Differs from Intention
The purpose test in the GAAR focuses on the
purpose of the provisions in domestic law or
treaties, not the state of mind or intention of the
lawmaker or treaty negotiator. As explained by
Lord Burrows, purposive statutory interpretation
“may be said to be analogous to identifying the
principle behind a common law precedent and
that, too, is not dependent on trying to identify
50
any person’s (i.e. judge’s) intention.” The
legislator’s intention is practically irrelevant. The
focus should be on the statute’s words, context,
and purpose:
A serious objection to any reference to
legislative intention is that it is advocating
an approach that favours the law’s
ossification by inappropriately freezing the
law in the past. We would not accept such
an approach for the common law and
there is no good reason why we should
regard it as acceptable when interpreting
51
legislation. [Emphasis added.]
If legislative purpose is not dependent on
legislative intention in constructing domestic
statutes, should the same approach apply to
treaty interpretation?
It can be argued that intention may be more
relevant in treaty interpretation because a treaty is

50

Andrew Burrows, Thinking About Statutes: Interpretation, Interaction,
Improvement, at 19-20 (2018).
49

Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, at para. 188.

51

Id. at 31.
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a contract between countries, and the intention of
contracting parties is important in contractual
interpretation. Also, the intention of the parties is
considered part of the “context of the treaty”
within the meaning of article 3(2) of the OECD
52
model.
On the other hand, concerns with imputing
legislative purpose from legislators’ intention in
statutory interpretation also apply to treaty
interpretation. The meaning and purpose would
be frozen at the time of conclusion of the treaty,
which is contradictory to the general principle of
ambulatory interpretation of tax treaties.53
Further, inferences may be drawn from different
extrinsic materials. For example, the majority in
Alta Energy considers the absence of a specific
anticonduit rule in the treaty, while the dissent
regards the implied exclusion principle irrelevant
and relies on the economic allegiance theory as
underpinning the logic of the treaty in allocating
taxing rights to the residence or source country.
Perhaps of greatest importance is the fact that,
in Canada, the GAAR applies to treaty provisions
because of two domestic statutes — the ITA and
the ITCIA. The GAAR explicitly refers to “an
abuse having regard to those provisions” and
makes no reference to the possible state of mind
(or intention) of individuals at the time the
provisions were drafted.
The danger in the majority’s approach is to
downplay or even neutralize the effect of using
the GAAR provision to replace a proliferation of
specific antiavoidance rules in both domestic
statutes and treaties. This approach may also
result in attributing bad faith on the part of treaty
negotiators toward third countries, by effectively
making the carveout available to persons in a
third country (in the case of Alta Energy, to
residents of the United States) in a way that
undermines the treaty bargain between Canada
and that third country.
The danger in the dissent’s reasoning is
imputing knowledge about the economic
allegiance theory that may not be considered by
treaty negotiators. To begin with, the influence of

this theory on the model convention is unclear.
The theory was formulated in a 1923 report by
four economists who were commissioned by the
League of Nations to study the issue of double
taxation.54 The economists’ considerations and
final recommendations provided some
intellectual basis but “were ultimately tempered
by practical considerations”55 in developing the
original model conventions in the 1920s. Secondly,
this theory is not mentioned in the text of original
models, the first OECD model published in 1963,
or the model in effect when the CanadaLuxembourg treaty was negotiated. It is also
absent in the commentaries on the OECD model.
It is the model convention that was relevant in
treaty negotiations. In general practice, treaty
negotiations regard traditional treaty norms as
most important, and only a small part of tax
56
treaties is originally drafted during negotiations.
No Canadian treaty mentions the economic
allegiance theory.
Judicial interpretation is about “discovering”
the meaning and purpose of the law, not being a
“mask for judges to hide their true reasoning by
dressing a decision up as effecting Parliamentary
intention.”57 The same can be said about treaty
interpretation:
In deciding on the best interpretation of a
statute, the courts need to rely on the more
concretised ideas that revolve around the
words, context and purpose of the statute.
Reliance on the “high-level” idea of
Parliamentary intention is unhelpful, at
best, and has the tendency to mask the
true reasoning and power of the courts.58

54

G.W.J. Bruins et al., Report on Double Taxation submitted to the
Financial Committee — Economic and Financial Commission Report by
the Experts on Double Taxation, E.F.S.73.F.19 (Apr. 5, 1923). For a general
discussion of the early models, see Sunita Jogarajan, Double Taxation and
the League of Nations (2018).
55

Jogarajan, supra note 54, at 21.

56

52

See OECD model, supra note 6, at commentaries on article 3(2),
para. 12.
53

Id. at para. 11; section 2 of the ITCIA, supra note 10.
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Burrows, supra note 50, at 18.
Id. at 19.
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D. Let the Treaty Speak
1. Text and Context of the Treaty
If the Canada-Luxembourg treaty were to
speak for itself, what would it say about the
purpose of the carveout in article 13(4)?
To answer this question, one must look
beyond the words in the carveout and consider
article 13 as a whole, other articles directly related
to article 13 in regard to distributing taxing rights
between the two countries, as well as the title,
preamble and other provisions of the treaty.
Under articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, one can
also consider any agreements between Canada
and Luxembourg in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty, any instrument related to
the treaty, subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty, and supplementary means of
interpretation, such as preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
59
Under Canadian case law, OECD
commentaries on the model convention have
“high persuasive value” in treaty interpretation.
The following discussions focus on the CanadaLuxembourg treaty per se.
2. The Carveout and Capital Gains Taxation
Article 13, read as a whole, suggests that, at its
core, the carveout is part of the general scheme of
the treaty in assigning taxing rights, as opposed to
a deliberate tax incentive.
The plain text of article 13(4) shows the
carveout as a departure from the paragraph, but
the context of the provision shows that the
carveout is more of an alignment with the general
logic of allocating taxing rights:
• article 13(1) allocates taxing right to the
source country in which immovable
property is situated, revealing a principle of
situs taxation;
• article 13(2) allocates taxing right to the
source country in which a permanent
establishment is located, revealing a
principle of PE taxation;
• article 13(3) allocates taxing right to the
residence country of an international
shipping or airline company;

• article 13(4) allocates taxing right to the
source country in which immovable
property is situated when such property is
held indirectly through a corporation,
partnership, or trust with the exception of
business property, which is consistent with
the principle of situs taxation; and
• article 13(5) leaves all residual gains,
including gains from alienation of shares
not governed by article 13(4), to be taxed in
the residence country.60
Unlike other distributive provisions (for
example, articles 6-8 and 10-12), article 13 has no
independent scheme for allocating tax rights; it
merely mirrors the scheme in other distributive
provisions, depending on the use of the property
that is alienated.61
Article 13(4) is a specific antiavoidance rule. A
similar provision was first added to the U.N.
model convention to protect the interest of source
62
countries. It backstops the principle of situs
taxation (taxation in the country in which
immovable property is located), which is
enshrined in article 6 (income from immovable
property) and article 13(1) (gains from alienation
of immovable property). Article 13(4) looks
through the corporate fiction that separates, in
law, the immovable property and its economic
owner (shareholder) to protect the integrity of the
principle of situs taxation.
On its face, the carveout is aligned with article
13(5) by assigning the taxing right to the residence
country of the shareholder — gains from the
alienation of any property not expressly referred
to in articles 13(1)-(4) are taxable in the country of
residence of the taxpayer. As a result, article 13(5)
applies to the alienation of shares that do not
derive their value principally from immoveable
property and to shares that do, if a business is
carried on in the property.

60

The Canada-Luxembourg treaty does not contain a provision such
as that in the U.N. model (article 13(5)) that allocates taxing rights over
gains from the alienation of a substantial shareholding of a nonimmovable property company to the source country (that is, the country
in the which the company whose shares are sold is resident). See Li and
Francesco Avella, “Article 13: Capital Gains,” in Global Tax Treaty
Commentaries (July 2021)
61

59

Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 802, at para. 55;
Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, at para. 38.

Li and Avella, id.

62

U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and
Developing Countries, article 13(5) (1980).
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In effect, the carveout treats immovable
property used in a business differently from
immovable property in general. As explained
below, this is consistent with the general scheme
of business taxation.
3. The Carveout and Business Taxation
The carveout clause in article 13(4) singles out
immovable property in which business is carried
on. As noted by Rowe and Martin,63 the capital
gains from the alienation of shares of Alta Canada
are derived, at least in part, from the business
activity of Alta Canada. The purpose of the
carveout may be gleaned from the treaty’s scheme
for taxing business profit.
Articles 7, 5, 10, 11, and 12 reveal a scheme for
taxing business activities and its prevalence over
the principle of taxing passive income (or income
from property):
• Article 7 assigns taxing rights over business
profits to the source country in which the PE
is located and through which business is
carried on, revealing the principle of PE
taxation. It imposes no limitation on tax rate.
• Article 5 defines PE to include a fixed place
of business, an oil or gas well, or any other
place relating to the exploration for or the
exploitation of natural resources. An
immovable property can thus be a PE.
• Article 10 assigns primary but limited (5
percent or 15 percent) taxing rights over
dividends to the source country and
residual rights to the residence country.
However, article 10(7) carves out dividends
that are in the nature of business profits or
are effectively connected with a PE so that
those dividends are taxable under article 7.
In other words, when the income takes the
form of dividends but is, in effect, derived
from business, it is taxed as business
income. Article 10(7) reflects a hierarchy in
assigning taxing rights — business taxation
trumps passive income taxation rules and
the principle of PE taxation prevails.
• Article 11 assigns primary but limited (10
percent) taxing rights on interest to the
source country and residual rights to the

63

Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, at para. 165.
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residence country. Article 11(6) is similar to
article 10(7).
• Article 12 assigns primary but limited (10
percent) taxing rights on royalties to the
source country and residual rights to the
residence country. Article 12(5) is similar to
article 10(7).
In the case of capital gains from the alienation
of shares of a corporation carrying on a business,
the taxing right lies with the country of residence
of the shareholder, unless the shares derive their
value principally from immoveable property
situated in the source country that is not used in a
business.
As a result, if a resident of Luxembourg
carries on business through a PE in Canada,
capital gains derived from the disposition of
immoveable property are taxable by Canada
under article 13(1) or (2). On the other hand, if a
Canadian corporation is used to carry on the
business, the taxing right will generally lie with
the country of the shareholder’s residence under
article 13(5). Such asymmetry reflects the basic
architecture of the treaty that recognizes each
corporation as a separate legal entity.
Why does the treaty assign taxing rights to a
capital gain on an alienation of shares to the
country of shareholder’s residence when a
corporate form is used to carry on business in an
immoveable property? The Court in Alta Energy
says this is a deliberate tax incentive. If so, is
article 13(5) that allocates taxing rights to the
country of residence on the alienation of shares
without immoveable property another
deliberative incentive?
A better explanation may simply be that the
look-through rule in article 13(4) and the carveout
ensure that source-country taxation on capital
gains from immoveable property used in a rental
or other “passive” activity cannot be avoided by
carrying out the activity in incorporated form.
Similar concerns about tax avoidance do not
apply to incorporated active business.
In addition to showing that the carveout
reflects the general logic of the treaty, the above
treaty provisions show the errors in the following
statements of the Court:
• The residence state “has the primary right to
tax passive income (e.g. interest, dividends,
and capital gains), and the source state has
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64

only residual rights.” Articles 10, 11, 12,
and 13 say that the source state has the
primary right to tax dividends, interest and
royalties, capital gains from immovable
property, and capital gains from movable
business property.
• “As a general rule, residence is taken to
indicate the state to which economic ties are
65
closest.” This generalization is not true for
income that is taxable primarily in the
source country under the PE taxation
principle and situs of immovable property
principle.
• The carveout of article 13(4) “allocates the
taxing right to the state of residence for its
residents’ capital gains from immovable
property when it is driven by business
activity, to reflect what Canada and
Luxembourg considered to be closer
economic ties with the residence state.”66
This statement confuses the general
rationale for using residence as a basis of
assigning taxing rights and the business
taxation principle.
4. Residence’s Treaty Meaning
Does residence in Luxembourg under the
treaty mean what Luxembourg domestic law says
(formal test by reference to legal seat), or does the
context of the treaty require some economic
connection? Why is residence chosen to define the
scope of the treaty?
The answer can be gleaned from the logic
underpinning the following provisions:
• Article 1 says that only residents are covered
by the treaty.
• Article 4 refers to domestic law for the
definition of residence.
• Article 28(3) says the treaty “shall not apply
to holding companies within the meaning of
the special Luxembourg laws (currently the
Act of July 31, 1929, and the Grand Duchy
Order of December 17, 1938) or any other
similar law enacted in Luxembourg after the

signature of the Convention, nor to
companies subjected to similar fiscal laws in
Luxembourg.” These holding companies
are subject to some restrictions in their
activities but are exempt from tax. As such,
they are different from general
67
corporations.
• Article 3(2) is a general interpretation rule
that says, unless the context otherwise
requires, the meaning of treaty terms that
are not defined in the treaty shall take their
meaning from domestic law. The context of
the treaty may require modifications to the
meaning under domestic law to achieve the
objectives of the treaty. In cases such as Alta
Energy, article 3(2) may permit the meaning
of residence to be more than a mere formal
presence required by Luxembourg domestic
law to better achieve the objectives of the
treaty.
The context of the treaty includes the
preamble, title, and other provisions as well as
68
preparatory work and subsequent practice.
Under the ambulatory approach to treaty
interpretation, the “treaty is always speaking” in
the sense that the meaning of treaty terms is not
frozen at the time of concluding the treaty but is
amended from time to time, often through
changes in domestic laws.
The title and preamble of the CanadaLuxembourg treaty mention the “avoidance of
double taxation.” To avoid double taxation, the
treaty assigns taxing rights by reference to
residence of taxpayers and source of income,
imposes limitations on source taxation, and
requires the residence country to recognize

67

The 1929 law defines a holding company as a company whose
statutory objects are the acquisition — in any form — and management
of participations in other Luxembourg or foreign corporations without
exercising a commercial or industrial activity. Luxembourg tax law also
has a participation exemption system that exempts from tax any
dividends from foreign subsidiaries and capital gains from sale of shares
of foreign subsidiaries. A company qualifying for the participation
exemption system is not a holding company within the meaning of
article 28(3).
68
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Alta Energy, 2021 SCC 49, at para. 74.
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Id. at para. 154.
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Id. at para. 157.

Article 32 of the VCLT, supra note 20. When the Luxembourg treaty
was concluded, Canada had enacted the GAAR. The GAAR functions as
an interpretation rule as it requires the determination of the object, spirit,
and purpose of applicable provisions of domestic law or treaty law.
Section 4.1 of the ITCIA confirms that the GAAR applies to treaty
interpretation. Luxembourg and Canada are presumed to accept this.
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source-country taxation and provide double tax
relief through exemption or foreign tax credit. As
such, residence is a basis for assessing tax liability.
Under the domestic law of both countries,
residence-based taxation is broader than sourcebased taxation. In the absence of double taxation,
the raison d’être of the treaty is missing.
The beneficial owner test in articles 10, 11, and
12 and the exclusion of Luxembourg holding
companies in article 28(3) support the argument
that the treaty is not applicable to a “formal”
resident of a treaty country that is not taxed in the
residence country. Nominal owners of income
pass on their income to beneficial owners and do
not pay tax on the income. The special holding
companies in Luxembourg are tax-exempt entities
under Luxembourg law. Therefore, the treaty
does not benefit these formal residents. There is
an implicit anticonduit principle emanating from
these provisions.
The Canadian GAAR is part of the treaty
context because Parliament clearly says so in
section 4.1 of the ITCIA. Instead of adding specific
anti-treaty-abuse rules, Parliament decided to
prevent tax avoidance through the GAAR.
Therefore, the GAAR can be understood to extend
the anticonduit principle implicit in articles 10, 11,
12, and 28(3) to other provisions, such as article
13.
The intention of treaty negotiators forms part
of the context of the treaty within the meaning of
article 3(2). Treaty negotiators can be presumed to
know their own country’s tax law, including the
GAAR, and the other country’s domestic tax law.
They can also be presumed to act in good faith
while seeking to maximize the economic benefit
of the treaty for their countries. As between the
intentions found by the majority and dissent, the
dissent’s finding is more consistent with what the
treaty provisions imply.
Given the acceptance of the majority and
dissent that economic allegiance underlies the
allocation of taxing rights in the treaty, including
article 13, and the fact that residence is one of the
two expressions of economic allegiance, it is only
logical to expect residence to include some
economic connection. It is debatable about what
type or level of economic connection is required,
but categorically accepting formal or legal
connection defies the logic of economic allegiance.
160

E. A Note on Litigation and Judicial Interpretation
The above contextual analysis of treaty
provisions is largely missing in the Alta Energy
decision. It is difficult to know whether any of the
justices would accept this analysis if it were
presented to them; judges generally consider only
arguments advanced by the parties.
Litigation strategies may also affect the case
outcome. In Alta Energy, the MNR accepted that
Luxco was a resident of Luxembourg and was
technically entitled to the treaty benefit. This
reflects a feature of Canadian tax jurisprudence
that favors a form-over-substance approach to
constructing taxpayer’s transactions. To deny that
benefit under the GAAR requires the MNR to
prove that the abuse is clear. Had the MNR
challenged the residence status from the inception
of the dispute resolution process and argued that
residence requires some economic connections, it
may or may not have affected the outcome of the
case, although the focus would not be on the
purpose of the carveout, but the meaning of
residence.
The majority holds the common-law
principles, including respect for the right of
taxpayers to legitimate tax minimization (or the
Duke of Westminster principle), as the “bedrock of
tax law”69 and relies on them to limit the
application of the GAAR. Such degree of
adherence to common-law principles is
somewhat surprising as the Court’s own
jurisprudence holds that the GAAR was enacted
70
to attenuate the Duke of Westminster principle.
IV. Observations
A. Implications for the GAAR
The Alta Energy case will likely make it more
difficult for the GAAR to apply in general. The
implied exclusion principle means that any tax
avoidance transaction that is not explicitly
addressed by a provision is presumed to be
intended, and thus not abusive. Limiting the
GAAR to preventing only “unforeseen”
avoidance transactions narrows its scope.
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Alta Energy, 2021 SCR 49, at para. 1.
Canada Trustco, 2005 SCC 54, at para. 13.
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This case also exposes the deficiency in the
judicial interpretation of the GAAR by
distinguishing between “general statutory
interpretation” by focusing on the meaning of the
provisions and purposive interpretation in the
context of a GAAR analysis. The MNR
presumably understood “residence” to have a
technical meaning under Luxembourg domestic
law and considered the treaty-shopping
arrangements “valid on their face” so that GAAR
must be used. Had a contextual and purposive
interpretation been considered, the MNR may
have pleaded differently.
To prevent treaty abuse, Parliament could
consider amending the ITCIA by adding a
provision to define “residence in a treaty country”
to have some meaningful economic connections
or incorporating a more evidence-based LOB as
part of Canadian treaties.
B. Implications for the PPT
The PPT or similar purpose-based antiabuse
rules in Canada’s tax treaties will likely be affected
by Alta Energy. However, the inclusion of the
following revised preamble by virtue of article 6
of the MLI may lessen the impact:
Intending to eliminate double taxation
with respect to the taxes covered by this
agreement without creating opportunities
for non-taxation or reduced taxation
through tax evasion or avoidance
(including through treaty-shopping

arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs
provided in this agreement for the indirect
benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).
Presumably, the intention to prevent treatyshopping arrangements would influence the
finding of the object and purpose of provisions.
Further, since economic allegiance is accepted
by the Court as the foundation for allocating
taxing rights, lacking economic allegiance may be
an important factor to consider in future cases. It
may be possible to distinguish a future treaty
abuse case from Alta Energy when the provision in
question is not viewed as a tax incentive, although
a court may find any deviation from the OECD
model as a tax incentive of some sort.
C. Treaty Interpretation
The Alta Energy judgement illustrates some of
the challenges in applying the purpose test in
treaty-shopping cases. Even though it may have a
unique Canadian flavor it should offer some food
for thought about treaty interpretation in general
and applying the purpose test in particular. The
analysis and reasoning of the Court show the
problems of assuming negotiators’ intention from
broad extrinsic evidence, conflating intention
with purpose and lacking sufficient consideration
of the differences between treaties and domestic
laws. To improve certainty and predictability, the
finding of purpose should be more guided by the
actual bargain reflected by the treaty itself. 
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